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The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider 
Trading on the Stock Market 
Jean-Jacques Laffont 
University of Touloz~se 
Eric S. Maskin 
Harvard University 
We study the behavior of a large trader with private information 
about the mean of an asset with a risky return. We argue that if the 
variability of the return is not too great, typically the trader will find 
it desirable to ensure that the market price does not reveal his infor- 
mation, that is, that a "pooling" equilibrium arises. Such an equilib- 
rium has the advantage of avoiding the incentive constraints that 
arise in "separating" equilibria, where information can be inferred 
from prices. Thus the efficient market hypothesis may well fail if 
there is imperfect competition. Despite the uninformativeness of 
prices, the other (competitive) traders are also better off in the pool- 
ing equilibrium than in any separating equilibrium, again if one 
assumes limited variability. 
I. Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis holds that in markets with signifi- 
cant informational asymmetries (e.g., securities markets) equilibrium 
prices aggregate information effectively. Thus a trader can infer all 
he needs to know about others' information simply from observing 
prices. 
Most theoretical examinations of this hypothesis (e.g., Grossman 
1976; Radner 1979; Allen 1981) have posited perfect competition, in 
which individual traders are too small to affect market prices. By and 
large this literature has confirmed the informational efficiency of 
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markets: As long as there are "enough prices" (i.e., trade can be made 
contingent on sufficiently many events), competitive equilibrium is 
generically "separating" in the sense that the function relating infor- 
mation to prices is invertible. Imperfect competition adds a new com- 
plication to the efficient market question because, when some traders 
are large, the amount of information conveyed by prices is to some 
degree a matter of their strategic choice. In fact, we shall argue that, 
when traders have rational expectations, there are good reasons to 
believe that the efficient market hypothesis breaks down with imper- 
fect competition. A large trader will typically find it advantageous to 
conceal his private information parameter by ensuring that the equi- 
librium price is not sensitive to local variations in this parameter; that 
is, he will induce an equilibrium of a (locally, at least) "pooling" na- 
ture. 
Suppose that the large trader's parameter 8 is positively correlated 
with the mean value of a particular asset. At first sight, the bias in 
favor of a pooling equilibrium for this asset-one in which the same 
price emerges for both high and low values of 6-may seem puzzling. 
If the large trader is a net buyer of the asset, a pooling equilibrium 
has the apparent advantage that he can buy the asset for less than in a 
separating equilibrium if 8 is high (since in the pooling equilibrium 
the market price corresponds to an average of the high and low values 
of 6). But by the same token, he must pay more than in the separating 
equilibrium when 8 is low. Thus it might seem as though either a 
pooling or a separating equilibrium could be better depending on the 
particular utility functions, probabilities, and so forth. 
Actually, however, rational expectations require that, in pooling 
and separating equilibria, the expected price paid by the large trader 
be (approximately) the same. The reason is that if the sellers (small 
traders) are price takers, the market price simply equals their "mar- 
ginal cost" of selling (i.e., their marginal disutility). Thus if 8 takes on 
the values 01 and O2 with probabilities n l  and .n2, the prices in a 
separating equilibrium are p(O1) = MC(O1) and p(02) = MC(02), and 
in a pooling equilibrium, the price is p = nl  MC(Ol) + .n2MC(02). In 
either case, the expected price is n l  MC (01) + n2MC (02). (The qualifica- 
tion of approximate equality is made above because, in general, the 
marginal costs depend on the quantity sold, and, moreover, the equa- 
tionp = .nlMC(O1)+ n2MC(02) implies risk neutrality on the part of 
the sellers. However, the approximation is good enough when O1 and 
O2 are close.) 
Thus the important difference between separating and pooling 
equilibria lies not with prices but rather with quantities. In a pooling 
equilibrium, the large trader can buy all he wants at the market price 
(given the presumed linearity of the small traders' disutility). But this 
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cannot be the case in a separating equilibrium because, in such an 
equilibrium, the price of the asset is low when the value of 8 is low. If 
the large trader could buy all he wanted at such a price, he would see 
to it that the price was always low, violating the hypothesized separat- 
ing nature of equilibrium. Hence, the trader must be quantity- 
constrained at the low price. This incentive constraint implies that, on 
average, he cannot buy as much in a separating equilibrium as in a 
pooling equilibrium. Hence, he will favor the pooling equilibrium. 
This simple argument assumed linear preferences on the part of 
sellers. However, it is suggestive of the general argument, which we 
provide below in proposition 6. For similar reasons it follows that just 
as the large trader prefers pooling, so do the other traders (proposi- 
tion 9). 
There is quite a substantial empirical literature on large trader 
behavior in asset markets (see Niederhoffer and Osborne 1966; Lo- 
rie and Niederhoffer 1968; Kraus and Stoll 1972; Scholes 1972; Grier 
and Albin 1973; Jaffe 1974; Dann, Mayers, and Raab 1977; Baesel 
and Stein 1979), but relatively few theoretical investigations. One set 
of papers assumes that the large trader can commit to a strategy ex 
ante (i.e., before the informational parameters have been realized). 
The solution concept is therefore Stackelberg equilibrium. Gould and 
Verrecchia (1985) develop a static model with a single risk-neutral 
large trader with private information (a specialist) and many risk- 
averse small traders. The specialist sets a price, and the others choose 
the quantities they wish to trade at this price. Pricing strategies are 
restricted to be linear in information with additive noise. It is found 
that, when the small traders also possess private information, the 
specialist profits by garbling his information (taking the noise term to 
be nondegenerate). When only the specialist has private information, 
he is hurt by adding noise. Grinblatt and Ross (1985) examine a 
similar model that also features a set of irrational or "noise" traders. 
Like Gould and Verrecchia, they restrict their analysis to linear strate- 
gies and find that introducing noise is not optimal. Cripps (1986) 
demonstrates that this result may rely crucially on linearity. In a re- 
lated model but with fewer restrictions on strategies, he finds that 
some pooling is desirable (see also Kihlstrom and Postlewaite 1983). 
One objection to these models is that it is difficult to see how the 
large trader can commit himself to a pricing strategy beforehand. To  
begin with, in many circumstances there is no "beforehand." Often, a 
trader is in the market only because he has acquired private informa- 
tion. Before obtaining this information, he may not foresee his par- 
ticipation and so cannot contemplate what his strategy will be. But 
even if there is a well-defined ex ante period, the trader will generally 
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wish, once he acquires his information, to charge a price different 
from the one prescribed by his Stackelberg strategy.' 
Another shortcoming of some of the papers is the restriction to 
linearity. The principal justification offered for looking only at linear 
strategies seems to be analytic convenience. 
Kyle (1985) overcomes the first drawback (although not the sec- 
ond). He constructs a dynamic model in which a large insider faces 
irrational players and risk-neutral market makers. Rather than as- 
sume that the insider can precommit to a strategy, he supposes that, at 
all dates, the insider's behavior is optimal given the strategies and 
beliefs of the others; that is, he studies perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
(PBE). One interesting feature of the equilibrium examined is that 
the insider trades in such a way that his private information is incor- 
porated by prices only gradually. However, Kyle derives only the 
equilibrium in which traders use linear strategies (see also Altug 
1985). 
As we explain in Section IV, models such as Kyle's and ours tend to 
exhibit many PBEs. Thus some restriction is necessary if any predic- 
tions are to be made. However, simply imposing linearity seems quite 
arbitrary. Our approach is to suppose that, by virtue of his market 
power, the large trader should be able to influence not only the mar- 
ket price but also traders' beliefs. We maintain, therefore, that a natu- 
ral PBE on which to focus is the one most favored by the large trader. 
We study this equilibrium without imposing any a priori restriction on 
strategies. 
In Section 11, we lay out a model of an asset market with a large 
"inside" trader and many small outsiders. The large trader is an in- 
sider by virtue of having private information about the mean of the 
asset's return. In Section 111, we define perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
and show that PBEs satisfy two monotonicity properties (proposition 
1). Section IV demonstrates that a completely separating equilibrium 
always exists in our model (proposition 2) and that a completely pool- 
ing equilibrium also exists (proposition 3) provided that the informa- 
tion parameter 8 does not vary too much (proposition 4 shows what 
can go wrong with excessive variability). There is also a continuum of 
intermediate equilibria. However, proposition 5 establishes that the 
large trader's favorite equilibrium will always involve complete pool- 
ing or complete separation. In Section V, we formalize the intuitive 
' One possible justification for the Stackelberg equilibrium is concern for reputation, 
if the large trader transacts on this market repeatedly. But as we explain in Laffont and 
Maskin (1987), such a reputation effect relies on quite sophisticated behavior on the 
part of small traders. 
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argument above and demonstrate in proposition 6 that pooling is 
optimal for the large trader provided that 8 does not vary too much. 
(Drawing on propositions 4 and 5, proposition 7 establishes the op- 
timality of separating equilibrium for a highly variable 8.) Through 
Section V, we concentrate on the case in which 8 reflects information 
about the asset's mean return. In Section VI, we briefly argue that our 
results carry through when 8 measures the variability of the return 
(proposition 8). We examine the welfare of the small traders in Sec- 
tion VII, where we establish that they too prefer pooling to separating 
equilibria (proposition 9) when 8 does not vary too much. Finally, we 
offer a few concluding comments in Section VIII. The Appendix 
provides the proofs of propositions 2-5 and 9. 
11. The Model 
We consider a two-period model with two assets: a safe asset (money) 
with (gross) return normalized to one and a risky asset with return 8 
+ e ,  where 5 is a zero-mean random variable with cumulative distri- 
bution function F and 8 is a random variable, independent of 5, that 
takes on the values O1 and O2 (01 < 02) with probabilities IT^ and TTZ. 
Assets are traded in period 1 and 5 is realized in period 2. The 
variable 8 is realized in the first period (before trade), but its value is 
not known to all traders. 
There is a continuum of identical risk-averse traders of Lebesgue 
measure one who initially own all the risky asset but do not know the 
realization of 8 in the first period. In period 1, the endowment of the 
typical small trader comprises wo units of money and one unit of risky 
asset. His budget constraint in period 2 is therefore 
where money is the numeraire, u is the price of the risky asset, b is the 
final money holding, and a is the share of the risky assets that he 
keeps. His income in period 2 is therefore b + a(8 + 5) or, from ( l ) ,  
If u(.) (u' > 0, u" < 0) is the small trader's von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function for second-period income, his expected 
utility in period 1 is 
or, if we set U(0, a ,  u) = Eu(wo + u + a(0 + 5 - u)), 
We shall assume that u exhibits nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. 
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In our model, there is also a risk-neutral large trader who has a 
period 1 endowment of one unit of money and zero units of the risky 
asset. Unlike the small traders, he knows the realization of 0. If 0 = 0 
and he buys a share P of the risky asset, his expected payoff in period 
1 is 1 + P(0 - v ) .  
After learning 0, the large trader chooses a quantity to buy. Price 
adjusts to equate supply and demand, that is, P = 1 - a .  Equiva-
lently, we can assume (and this is the approach we take here) that he 
chooses a price v ,  and so the small traders determine the quantity 
exchanged. In period 2 the realizations of 0 and i become public 
knowledge. 
A large-trader strategy is a mapping v :  { e l , 02)+ R that prescribes a 
price v(0)on the basis of the trader's private information 0.  In princi- 
ple, v ( . )can be a random function. We show in proposition 3, how-
ever, that randomness is never optimal for the large trader. 
A small-trader strategy is a mapping a :  R + [O, 11  that represents the 
share of the risky asset retained for each price. Given the strict con- 
cavity of u,  the optimal a given v will always be unique. 
Conditional beliefs for the typical small trader are represented by a 
mapping that associates to each price v a probability function g ( .Iv )on 
(81, 02),  where g ( O  1 v ) is the probability that the small trader attaches to 
the value 0 given price v .  
111. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
A pefect Bayesian equilibrzum for our model is a pair of strategies ( v ( . ) ,  
a ( . ) )and a family of conditional beliefs g ( .I .) such that (i) for all v in 
the range of v ( . ) ,  g ( .  I v )  is the conditional probability of 0 obtained by 
updating the prior (nl,n2),using v ( . ) ,in Bayesian fashion; (ii) for all 
v ,  a ( v )  E argmax, E:= U(0,,  a ,  v)g(O,lv);  and (iii) for all 0 ,  v (0 )  E 
argmax" [ l  - a ( v ) ]  (0 - v ) .  
Condition i stipulates that small traders have rational expectations. 
Conditions ii and iii are simply the requirements that traders be op- 
timizing. Condition iii implies that 
[ 1  - a(v(0))1[0- v(0)1 
( 2 )
[ l  - a(v(O1))][O- v(B1)]  for any 0 ,  0 ' .  
Perfect Bayesian equilibria satisfy the following two standard mono- 
tonicity properties. 
PROPOSITION1 .  In any PBE, a ( . )  is nonincreasing on the set of 
prices that are charged in equilibrium and v ( . )is nondecreasing. 
Proof. Formula ( 2 )can be rewritten as 
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where v, is in the range of v(0,)and a ,  = a(v , )for i = 1, 2. Adding (3a)  
and ( 3b )yields 
Therefore, 
c x l  2 ap. 
Now suppose, contrary to the proposition, that v l  > U P  In view 
of (41, 
contradicting (3a). Hence I ) ( . )  is nondecreasing and, from ( 4 ) ,  a ( . )  is 
nonincreasing, as required. Q.E.D. 
In common with other signaling models, there is, in general, a 
considerable multiplicity of equilibria in our framework. To help 
characterize these equilibria, we first define &(v ,  0 )  to be the fraction 
of the asset retained by small traders if price is v and they know that 8 
= 0. Similarly, let cxO(v,e l , 0 2 )be the fraction retained if the probabil- 
ity that 8 = Oi is T,.Note that & and a" are well defined because of the 
concavity of the small traders' utility function. We first show that they 
are increasing in 0. To obtain this result, we shall invoke our assump- 
tion of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion on the part of the small 
traders. Moreover, we shall assume an interior solution to the small 
traders' problem. 
LEMMA.&*(a, 0 )  > 0 and ag(v ,  0 1 ,  02 )  > 0, where subscripts denote 
partial derivatives. 
Proof. &(v ,  0 )  solves 
max Eu(wo  + zl + a(O + E - v ) ) .  
a 

Hence, the first-order condition is 
E(0  + 5 - v ) u f (wo+ v + B(v , 0 ) ( 0  + 5 - v ) )  = 0.  ( 3 )  
Differentiating ( 3 )with respect to 0 ,  we obtain 
The denominator of the right-hand side of ( 6 )is negative because u" 
< 0. Because of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, E(0  + E - v)u" 
2 0 (see Arrow 1971) ,  and so the numerator is negative as well. 
Hence, with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, &p(v, 0 )  > 0. The 
argument is similar for cx':(v, 0 1 ,  02). Q.E.D. 
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IV. Separating and Pooling Equilibria 
Using the lemma, we shall show that there always exists a completely 
separating equilibrium in our model. First define u*(0) to be the solu- 
tion of the program 
For convenience, we shall assume throughout that the solution to ( 7 )  
is unique for all 0 ,  so that u*(0) is well defined. Take 
The pair (u*(0) ,  a* (0 ) )  are the equilibrium price and quantity that 
would obtain if the small traders had perfect information, that is, if 
they knew that 8 = 0. Notice that 
and so 
PROPOSITION I <2. There exists a PBE (u( . ) ,  a ( . ) ,  g ( . .)) in which ~ ( 0 1 )  
~ ( 0 ~ ) .  = (v*(02),  a*(Opj), Moreover, in this equilibrium, (u (02) ,  ~ ( 8 ~ ) )  
and v ( . )  is a solution to the following program: 
max 1wi(ei - u z ) [ l  - t i (ui ,  oz) l  
L'IIL'? 
subject to 
for any positive weights wl and w2. 
We relegate the formal proof of proposition 2 to the Appendix, but 
we can readily describe the construction of equilibrium. We take ~ ( 8 ~ )  
= u*(B2)and let ~ ( 0 ~ )be a u l  that solves (7)subject to (10 ) .Because 
these choices of v(O1)and ~ ( 0 ~ )are independent of wl and u p ,  they 
solve program (9) - (10)  for any choice of weights. To  complete the 
description of equilibrium, we take a (u , )  = &(u,, 0,) ,  for i = 1, 2 ;  a ( u )  
= &(v ,  0,), for u @ { u l ,  up ) ;  g(O,Ju,) = 1, for i = 1, 2 ;  a n d g ( 0 2 ) v )= 1, 
for u @ { v l ,  up ) .  
Notice that when 8 = 02, the large trader is unconstrained by the 
informational imperfection: the price and allocation are the same as 
though the small traders could directly observe 8. When 8 = e l ,  
however, u and a are restricted by the incentive constraint (10 ) .  
The beliefs g(.Iu) that we invoke in the proof of proposition 2 are 
extreme and discontinuous: for u = u(O1),the small traders believe 
that 8 = e l ,but for an only slightly different price they believe that 8 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
= 0'. Using the methods of Laffont and Maskin ( 1 987 ) ,however, we 
could devise alternative beliefs that are continuous and monotonic 
in v .  
Figure 1 illustrates the separating equilibrium of proposition 2 in a-
I space, where I is the amount of a small trader's wealth invested in 
the safe asset: I = wo + v ( l  - a).' The curve O(0 )is a small trader's 
offer curve when he believes that 0 = 0 .  It is obtained by maximizing 
expected utility Eu(I + a ( 0  + C)) subject to the budget constraint I + 
v ( 0 ) a  = wo + u (0 ) .The large trader maximizes his linear objective 
function 0 ( 1  - a) - I (whose indifference curves have slope - 0  if 0 
= 0 )  over the offer curve (subject to the incentive constraint [ l o ] ) .  
Denote the solution by %(0) .Then %(0)is the equilibrium allocation 
when 0 = 0 .As we noted above, %(02 )is constrained only by the offer 
curve 0 ( 0 2 ) ,where %( 0 1 )not only must lie on 0 ( 0 1 )but must satisfy the 
We thank a referee for suggesting this graphical illustration 
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restriction that if 8 = 02, the large trader does not prefer 8 ( 0 1 )to 
E(02) .  
We next demonstrate that, at the opposite end of the spectrum, a 
pooling equilibrium always exists when 0 ,  is not too far from 02. 
PROPOSITION3. For 01 sufficiently near 02, there exists a PBE ( v ( - ) ,  
a ( - ) ,g ( . I - ) )  in which ~ ( 0 1 )= ~ ( 0 2 )= vO(O1, 02) ,  where v = vO(O1, 0 2 )  
solves the program 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The pooling equilibrium of proposition 3 is illustrated in figure 2. 
The small traders' offer curve O ( E ~ )is obtained by maximizing 
.rrlEu(I + a(O1+ C)) + .rr2Eu(I + a (02  + 5 ) )  subject to the budget 
constraint I + v ( 0 ) a  = wo + v ( 0 ) .The equilibrium allocation B(E8 ) is 
obtained by choosing the allocation on O(E8 )that maximizes the large 
trader's expected utility (his indifference curves have slope - E 8 ) .  
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The requirement in proposition 3 that O1 and O2 not be too far apart 
is needed to ensure that the large trader has no incentive to set v f 
U'(O~,02). To  see that this constraint can be a problem, we next note 
that a pooling equilibrium may fail to exist if O2 is too big relative to 81. 
PROPOSITION xul(x) and a*(0) < 1 for all 4. Suppose that lim,,, = 
0. Given 01, there exists 82 such that there is no pooling equilibrium 
for 02 > 82. 
If the large trader is willing to buy when 0 = 01, then an equilib- 
rium pooling price v must satisfy u 5 81. But given such a low price, 
the small traders will refuse to sell if 02 is big enough. Thus for such 
02, the large trader buys nothing in a pooling equilibrium. But be- 
cause a*(02) < 1, the large trader can obtain a positive payoff by 
setting price v*(B2), a contradiction. The formal proof can be found in 
the Appendix. 
V. The Large Trader's Favorite Equilibrium 
When a pooling equilibrium exists, there is also a continuum of 
"semiseparating" equilibria (where either ~ ( 01 )  or ~ ( 0 2 )  is a random 
variable) intermediate between complete pooling and complete 
separating (there are also pooling and separating equilibria other 
than the ones we constructed in propositions 2 and 3). We argued in 
the Introduction, however, that by virtue of his market power, the 
large trader ought to be able to influence other traders' beliefs and so 
ensure a favorable equilibrium for himself. 
The simplest way that he can accomplish this is, before learning the 
value of 0, to make a public announcement that he will play his favor- 
ite equilibrium. If the small traders believe him, they can do no better 
than play their corresponding equilibrium strategies. Moreover, it 
makes sense for them to believe him since, if they do, he has no 
incentive to deviate. 
Of course, such a public pronouncement may be implausible or 
impossible. In Laffont and Maskin (1987), we consider another way of 
formalizing the large trader's influence over beliefs. Suppose that the 
market is repeated many times (where 0 is drawn independently each 
time), that small traders have prior beliefs about the statistical rela- 
tionship between 0 and u, and that they update these beliefs on the 
basis of their previous experience (under the hypothesis that the joint 
distribution between 0 and u is stationary). Suppose that the large 
trader's discount rate is near zero (which is equivalent to supposing 
that he transacts frequently). If he chooses prices over time to max- 
imize his expected discounted sum of payoffs and if, as a result, 
buyers' beliefs converge over time, behavior ultimately closely ap- 
proximates that in the PBE (of the one-shot model) that maximizes 
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the large trader's ex ante expected payoff E?=1 ~ ~ ( 0 ~vi)(l - a i )  (In -
Laffont and Maskin [1987], we also examine a more game-theoretic 
foundation for this equilibrium.) 
A quite different justification for focusing on the large trader's 
favorite PBE derives from the welfare analysis in Section VII below. It 
turns out that provided that 8 does not vary too much, the pooling 
equilibrium of proposition 3 not only is the large trader's favorite 
PBE, but is preferred by the small traders to any separating equilib- 
rium. Thus Pareto dominance favors pooling. 
Henceforth, we shall simply assume that the large trader is able to 
attain his ex ante best PBE (BPBE) and shall study the properties of 
this equilibrium. We first observe that we may as well assume that the 
BPBE is deterministic (i.e., either a pure separating or a pure pooling 
equilibrium). 
PROPOSITION .)) in which v(.) is 5 .There exists a BPBE (v(.), a(.), g ( . I  
deterministic. 
If (v(.), a(.),g ( . l . ) )  is a BPBE in which v(O1) and ~ ( 0 ~ )  are random, 
choose vi E support of v(0,), i = 1, 2, so that vl < max{support of 
~ ( 8 ~ ) )5 min{support of ~ (02 ) )  < v2. Then we can construct an alterna- 
tive PBE (a(.),E ( . ) ,  g(-1.))in which 3(Oi) = vi, i = 1, 2. (The large 
trader's incentive constraints will be satisfied since they hold for the 
original PBE.) Clearly, the large trader's payoff, for each value of Bi, is 
the same as before, and so the new PBE is a deterministic BPBE. For 
the details and the other cases (where one of v(B1) and ~ ( 0 ~ )  is not
random), see the Appendix. 
We next turn to our main result: the observation that the large 
trader profits from concealing his information if O1 and O2 are not too 
far apart. 
PROPOSITION6. If O1 and O2  are sufficiently close, the BPBE is the 
pooling equilibrium that solves program (1 1). 
Proof. From proposition 3, program (1 1) defines a pooling equilib- 
rium that exists for O1 near enough 02, and, by virtue of proposition 5, 
we need compare it only with the large trader's favorite separating 
equilibrium. From proposition 2, this latter equilibrium solves the 
program 
subject to 
Clearly, the solution (v(01), ~ (02 ) )  to the program (12)-(13) satisfies 
~ ( 0 ~ )  # 02), ~ ( 01 )  #= v*(02). We first show that, for O1 near O2 (but 
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v*(O1). Applying the envelope theorem, we have 
which is negative because 62 > 0. Thus if ~ ( 0 1 )  = v*(O1), (13) is con- 
tradicted. Thus ~ ( 0 ~ )  # v*(B1), as claimed. 

Now for O 1  near 02, v1 = v*(O1) violates (13) but ~ ( 0 ~ )  
is near v*(O1). 
Hence, ~ ( 0 ~ )  must satisfy (13) with equality. But (13) is violated for all 
vl between v*(O1) and v*(02), and, from proposition 1, ~ ( 0 ~ )  5 ~"(82).  
Hence ~ ( 0 ~ )  is the largest price less than v*(O1) such that (13) holds 
with equality. 
The derivative of the large trader's payoff in the separating equilib- 
rium with respect to O1 is 
The right-hand side of (14) can be rewritten as 
Because (13) is binding, 
Hence 
But at O 1  = 02, the left-hand side of (17) and the expression in braces 
in (15) are the same. Therefore, from (14), (15), and (17), 
Applying the envelope theorem to the solution vO(O,, 02) to pro- 
gram (1 l) ,  we find that the derivative of the large trader's payoff with 
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respect to O1 is 
But because a: > 0, the right-hand side of ( 1 9 ) is less than that of ( 1 8 ) .  
Hence, because the pooling and separating equilibria generate the 
same payoffs when O1  = 02, the former yields the large trader the 
higher payoff for O 1  near (but strictly less than) 02. Q.E.D. 
We provided a rough heuristic explanation for proposition 6 in the 
Introduction. Let us give a somewhat more rigorous but still intuitive 
account to supplement the formal proof. To see that the "downward" 
incentive constraint ( 1 3 )must be binding in a separating equilibrium 
when O1  is near 02, suppose that it is not. Then for i = =1,  2 ,  ~ ( 0 ~ )  
v*(Oi) ; that is, equilibrium prices are the same as they would be if the 
small traders knew the realization of 8. Now if 8 = 02, the effect on the 
large trader's payoff of setting v = v*(O1) rather than v = v * ( 0 2 )  is 
zero to the first order because the latter price maximizes (02 - v ) [ 1  -
B(v ,  0 2 ) ]  and v* (O1) is near v* (02 ) .  However, there is also an indirect 
effect that arises because B(v ,  81) <B(v ,  02) :  by setting v*(O1),the large 
trader makes the others believe that 8 = O1  and so lowers the propor- 
tion of the risky asset that they retain. Combining these two effects, 
we see that the large trader is better off setting v = v*(O1)when 8 = 
02, an impossibility. We thus conclude that ( 1 3 )  must be binding. 
Now in the separating equilibrium ( v ( . ) ,  a ( . ) ,  g ( . I . ) ) ,  consider what 
happens to the large trader's expected payoff as the value O 1  in-
creases. There are three effects: a direct increase at rate v l [ l  -
a (v (O1 ) ,@ I ) ] ,  an indirect decrease due to - a ( v ,  0 1 )  falling (at rate 
- a p ( v ,  e l ) ) ,  and another indirect increase due to v(O1)adjusting to 
keep ( 1 3 ) an equality: the closer O 1  is to 02, the less v(O1)has to deviate 
from v*(O1)in order to maintain ( 1 3 ) ,and so the greater is (01  - v l ) ( l  
- a ) .  In the pooling equilibrium, by contrast, the first two effects 
persist, but the third is not present since there is no incentive con- 
straint corresponding to ( 1 3 ) .Hence the rate of increase with O1  of the 
large trader's payoff is slower in the pooling than in a separating 
equilibrium. Since payoffs from the two equilibria are the same when 
01 = 02, therefore, the pooling payoff must be higher when O1  < 02. 
The pooling and separating equilibria are compared in figure 3 .  In 
the figure, the large trader's expected utility from the separating 
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equilibrium corresponds to %(e l )because, whether 0 = O1  or 0 = 82, 
the allocation % (01) gives rise to maximal utility. Therefore, the pool- 
ing equilibrium dominates the separating equilibrium since the line 
with slope - ~ 0  through % ( ~ 0 )  is below that through %(01) (lower 
indifference curves denote higher ~ t i l i t y ) . ~  
For O2 big enough relative to 01, a pooling equilibrium may fail to 
exist, as we noted in proposition 4. In such a case, the seller's favorite 
PBE is separating. 
PROPOSITION xu l ( x )  = m. For O2  sufficiently7 . Suppose that lim,,, 
big relative to 01, the BPBE is the separating equilibrium defined by 
proposition 2. 
Proof. From proposition 5, the BPBE is deterministic, that is, either 
completely separating or pooling. From proposition 4, a pooling equi- 
librium does not exist. Therefore, the BPBE must be the "best" 
A referee pointed out that, in general, a pooling equilibrium will dominate if .rr, is 
big enough, as fig. 3 makes clear. This observation complements proposition 6. 
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separating equilibrium, that is, the one defined by program (9)-(10) 
with wi = Q.E.D~ i i . ~  

VI. Private Information about Variability 
So far we have modeled the large trader's private information as 
knowledge about the mean return of the risky asset. For this section 
only, let us assume that the mean return is z and that private informa- 
tion parameter 0 instead reflects the variability of the asset. Specifi- 
cally, suppose that the distribution when 8 = is a mean-preserving 
spread (cf. Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) of that when 8 = 02. Then if 
B(v, 0) and cxO(v,0) are defined as in Section 111, we conclude, by virtue 
of the small trader's risk aversion, that B2 and a: are positive. 
In this setting, the large trader's payoff is 
independently of the realization of 8.Recall that in the informal dis- 
cussion following proposition 6, there were three effects on the large 
trader's payoff from raising in a separating equilibrium: (i) the 
direct effect, (ii) the effect on a,and (iii) the effect on v. We noted that 
in a pooling equilibrium, the third effect vanishes but i and ii remain. 
When 01 is replaced by as in (20), effect i vanishes in both the 
separating and pooling equilibria. But since we are subtracting the 
same effect from both equilibria, the large trader's payoff continues 
to increase faster in the separating equilibrium as a function of O1. 
Thus he continues to favor the pooling equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 
equilibrium if 01 and 02 are sufficiently close. 
8. In the variability model, the BPBE is a pooling 
Proof Parallels that of proposition 6. 
Just as proposition 6 continues to go through in the variability 
setting, so do propositions 2, 3, and 5. 
VII. Welfare 
We have concentrated until now on the large trader's welfare. Let us 
broaden our scope and consider the small traders' welfare as well. 
It is sometimes asserted that insider trading is undesirable because 
insiders profit at the expense of small traders. Often implicit in such 
assertions, however, is the assumption not only that small traders are 
worse informed but that they are irrational. When traders have ra- 
tional expectations, it is not at all clear that they can be "exploited" by 
insiders. Indeed, in our simple model, they clearly benefit from the 
Actually, however, the same solution results regardless of the weights w,, as we 
remarked following proposition 2. 
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presence of the large trader. Were he prohibited from trading, they 
would be stuck holding all the risky asset themselves. 
Moreover, although, as we have seen, the large trader may find it 
desirable to conceal his private information, this concealment need 
not work to the disadvantage of the small traders. As we shall show, 
the small traders prefer the pooling equilibrium of proposition 3 to 
any separating equilibrium provided that the variability of 8 is not too 
great. 
PROPOSITION9. If e l  and O2 are not too far apart, the small traders' 
ex ante utility is higher in the pooling equilibrium defined by pro- 
gram (17) than in any separating equilibrium. 
As was true for the large trader (see the intuitive argument follow- 
ing proposition 6), the small traders' welfare differs to the first order 
between a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium only be- 
cause, in the latter, the price ~ ( 8 ~ )  must be chosen to satisfy the incen- 
tive constraint (13). But this constraint implies that ~ ( 8 ~ )  must be less 
than the "full information" level u*(O1). Since lower prices hurt small 
traders, we conclude that they are worse off in the separating equilib- 
rium. This argument is formalized in the Appendix. 
Remark.-Although the traders are unanimous in preferring the 
pooling equilibrium of program (1 1) to any separating equilibrium, 
they do not agree on which pooling equilibrium is their favorite. The 
large trader, of course, likes the program (1 1) equilibrium best. The 
small traders, however, prefer the equilibrium with the highest possi- 
ble price. 
It is interesting to note that the effect on welfare of 8 being private 
information is ambiguous, for both large and small traders. Formula 
(19)represents the derivative of the large trader's payoff with respect 
to 81 when the value of 8 is private information (provided that the 
variability of 8 is not too great). One can readily show that the corre- 
sponding derivative when 8 is common knowledge is exactly the same. 
Thus the large trader's payoff does not depend to the first order on 
whether or not 8 is private information. Moreover, the second-order 
comparison depends on the second derivatives of a' and 8,which are 
not signable without additional assumptions on preferences. The 
analysis is similar for the small traders. 
Thus our model exemplifies the principle that two market imper- 
fections can be better than one. Introducing an informational asym- 
metry in the model may actually make all traders better off. 
VIII. Conclusion 
In competitive asset markets in which traders have rational expecta- 
tions, prices are likely (with some qualifications) to reflect all relevant 
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private information about the value of the asset. Indeed, if the large 
trader in the model of Section I1 were replaced by a continuum of 
price-taking, risk-neutral small traders with private information 0, the 
market price v(0) would just be 0, and so would reveal all information. 
We have argued, however, that in a model in which private infor- 
mation is possessed by a trader who is big enough to affect prices, the 
information efficiency of prices breaks down. Our model is very sim- 
ple, but the intuition for why the large trader gains from concealing 
his information seems quite general. We believe, therefore, that the 
same sort of reasoning ought to apply to more elaborate market struc- 
tures. 
Our welfare conclusions are less likely to generalize. MTe noted in 
our model that, not only the large trader but the small trader too may 
prefer a pooling equilibrium to any separating equilibrium (proposi- 
tion 9). This result, however, seems to depend on the small traders 
being on the opposite side of the market from the large trader. If 
there were also small traders buying the asset, then they would benefit 
from the fact that ~ ( 0 , )  must be comparatively low (see the discussion 
following proposition 9) in a separating equilibrium and so might 
prefer such an equilibrium. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In ( l o ) ,set up= v*(Op).Then &(up,02 )= a*(02).Clearly, &(u,e l ) = 1 for v low 
enough (possibly -m). Hence, there is a choice of v l  for which (10)holds. 
From the lemma, &(v*(Os),0 1 )<&(v*(Os),02) = a*(02).Hence (10)is violated 
when vl = v*(02).By continuity, there exists vy < v*(02)such that (10)holds 
with equality when vl = vy. Thus from ( l o ) ,  a*(02) < &(vy,e l ) ,and so 
Consider the program 
max (01- ul) [ l  - &(vl ,e l ) ]  
u1 
(A2) 
subject to 
From the argument above, constraint (A3)can be satisfied, and so a solution 
vl = v(O1)exists. Define ~ ( 0 2 )= u*(O2)and a ( v , )= &(v(O,),O , ) ,  i = 1 ,  2. 
Because (v(O1),a(v(Ol) ) )satisfies (A3) ,(3b)is satisfied, and in view of ( A l )and 
the fact that ~ ( 8 1 )solves (A2)-(A3),  (3a) is satisfied. Because ~ ( 8 ~ )u*(02)= 
and v(O1)solves (A2)-(A3),  v ( . )  solves the program (9)-(10) for any positive 
weights wl and w2.For rational expectations, we must takeg(O,l ~ ( 0 , ) )  1 for i= 
= 1 ,  2. For v # u(O,),let g(OsI v )  = 1 ,  and so a ( v )= &(v,  82). It remains to show 
that it does not pay the large trader to set v @ {v(O1),v(02)} .By definition of 
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v*(02), 
[0, - v(O2)][l- a(v(02))]2 ( A P  - u)[1- 6(u,  02)] for all v. (A4)  
Hence, we need only check that the large trader will not take v @ {v(O1),~ ( 8 2 ) )  
when 0 = e l .  
If u < n(O1),then, by definition of v(O1), 
which, because 82 > 0, implies that 
as desired. If u > v(O1),then, because (A3)holds with equality, 
If 1 - a(v(Ol))< 1 - 8(v,  02),  then (A6)and the fact that O 1  < OP  imply that 
(A5)holds. If 1 - > 1 - B(v, 02),  then the fact that 8 2  - ~ ( 8 ~ )-a(v(O1)) > 02 
v implies that (A5)holds again. Q.E .D .  
Proof of Proposition 3 
For convenience, we shall assume that the solution to ( 1  1 )  is unique, so that 
vO(O1,8 2 )  is well defined. T o  construct the pooling equilibrium, take ~ ( 0 ~ )= 
v(02)= vo(01,02), a(vo(Ol, 02)) = aO(uO(O1,02),01,02),and g(0,I vO(O1,O~)) = T,, 
i = 1 ,  2 .  It remains to construct the equilibrium for out-of-equilibrium prices. 
For any price v (# ~ O ( O ~ ,B s ) ) ,  let g(0~1u) = 1 .  We must show that, given these 
beliefs, the large trader will never set such a price if e l  and OP  are close 
enough. Suppose first that 8 = OP  If e l  = then the large trader will not 
gain by setting u # vO(O1, 0 ~ )  since, in this case, vO(O1, 82) = ~ " ( 0 ~ ) .Thus it 
suffices to show that, at e l  = 02, the large trader's payoff [02 - vO(O1,02)][1-
aO(vO(O1,O s ) ,  e l ,  02)]is decreasing in e l ,because then 
[eP- u0(el ,  e2) i[ i  - e2 ) ,01 ,@,)IaO(vO(el,  
> [0, - v*(O,)][l - a*(@?)]2 (0, - v ) [ l  - 6(v ,  02)]  for all z1 
when is near 02.No\+ 
But at C I 1  = 02,the first-order condition for the maximization in ( 1  1 )  is 
- (02 - ?'")a:- ( 1  - a")  = 0: 
and so the right-hand side of (A7)reduces to 
Since a! > 0, (A8)is negative at 0 ,  = O P ,  as required. 
Assume next that 8 = e l .  In this case, if the large trader failed to set zj = 
vO(O1, 02),  his best alternative is to choose v = 02) that solves the vOO(O1, 
following program: 
since g(021?1)= 82).Thus it suffices to show that his gain 1 for all v # v " ( ~ ~ ,  
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from choosing v0 rather than voOis decreasing in O 1  at e l  = Os, that is, 
But from the same application of the envelope theorem that we used in the 
previous paragraph, we can rewrite the left-hand side of (A9) as 
- ( e l  - u0)a:  + 1 - a" ( 1  - ti). 
Now a0 = B at = € I 2 ,  and a! > 0. Hence, (A9 )holds, as required. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Suppose that there exists a pooling equilibrium in which v(0,)= u and a(v(0 , ) )  
= a ,  i = 1 ,  2. If a < 1 ,  then 
nTTIE(A1+ i - v)ut(wO+ u + a(A1+ i - 3)) 
+ 7r2E(02+ i - v)u ' (wo+ u + a(02  + i - v ) )5 0 .  (A101 
Clearly, 0 5 v 5 € I 1 .  Therefore, the left-hand side of (A10 )is no less than 
( A l l )
+ n2E(02+ i - Ol)u'(wo+ ( 1  - a)O1 + a(02  + i ) ) .  
The first two terms of ( A 11 )  are independent of 02.Denote them by K. As On  
tends to infinity, so does the third term, thanks to our hypothesis about u.  
Thus eventually the third term exceeds I K 1 ,  a contradiction of (A10) .Hence, 
a = 1 ,  and so the large trader's payoff is zero when 8 = 82. But since a*(02)  
< 1 by hypothesis, he can obtain a positive payoff by setting ZJ = v*(02), 
a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Consider a BPBE (v ( . ) ,  a ( . ) ,  g(.I .)). From proposition 1 ;  
ma x { v ) vE support of v(o1)}5 min{v lv  E support of ~ ( 8 2 ) ) .(A12 )  
Suppose first that (A12 )  is strict. Then the small traders are perfectly in- 
formed about 0 by price. For i = 1 ,  2,  choose v,  E support of v(0,)such that 
U(0,, a(u,) ,  v,) 2 U(0,, a (u l ) ,  v : )  for all v: E support of ~ ( 0 , ) .But then we can 
define a deterministic PBE (5 ( . ) ,ti(.),g ( . / . ) )where, for z = 1 ,  2,  5(0,) = v, (and 
&(.) = a ( . )and g( . l . )  = g(.I .)) in which the large trader is as well off as before 
since he is indifferent among all prices in the support of ~ ( 8 ~ ) .  
Suppose henceforth that (A12 )  holds with equality and that both sides 
equal 5. If 5 is not a mass point of ~ ( 8 ~ )and u(02) ,the argument of the 
preceding paragraph applies. Assume, therefore, that Pr{u(B,)= 5 )> 0 for z 
= 1 ,  2. 
Case 1: Only u(O1)Is Random 
In this case, ~ ( 0 s )= 5. Define 5( . )so that 5(8,)= ii for i = 1 ,2 .Defineg(./.) so 
that g(0, /  5 )  = n , ,  i = 1, 2, and g( .lv)  = g(. lv)  for v # 5. Finally, let &(5)= 
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a0(5, 01, 0,) and h ( u )  = a ( v )for u Z 5. Because g(O115) >>(el1"j,6 ( 5 )< a ( 5 )  
from the lemma. Thus the large trader has no incentive to deviate from 5;  
that is, (u ( . ) ,  a ( . ) ,  g ( .  1 .)) is an equilibrium. Moreover, the large trader does 
better in _this equilibrium than in the orginal equilibrium, regardless of the 
value of 0. 
Case 2: ~ ( 0 2 )  Is Random 
Because g(O1 15) < 1, the lemma implies that a(" j  > >(Z ,  01). Hence, there 
exists v l  < 5 such that [ l  - B(u l ,  01 ) ] (01  - v l )  is the payoff that the large 
trader gets in equilibrium if 6 = e l . Thus B(ul , e l )> a(A1) ,and so 
Choose un E support of ~ ( 8 2 )with un > 5. Define ("j.),6 ( . ) ,g ( . / . ) )so that 
This construction satisfies the large trader's incentive constraints (condition 
iii of the definition of PBE) when 8 = O 1  since his payoff is the same as in 
the original PBE and, thanks to the lemma and to the definition of g(.I .), C(u)  
2 a ( v )  for all u # 5(B1).Moreover, it also satisfies his incentive constraints 
when 8 = O2  because 
where the two equations follow from construction and the inequality follows 
from (A13 ) .Hence, (5( . ) ,ti(.), g( . I .)) is an equilibrium and, hence, a determin- 
istic BPBE. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 9 
We first observe that, in any separating equilibrium (v ( . ) ,  a ( . ) ,  g(.I .)) ,  ~ ( 0 2 )  = 
u*(02).This follows since u = u*(A2)maximizes (O n  - v ) [ l  - B(u, 02 ) ]  and, 
from the large trader's standpoint, the most disadvantageous beliefs that the 
small traders could have are g(02I v )  = 1. 
From the proof of proposition 6, the separating equilibrium (u*(.), a*(.),  
g * ( / . ) )that solves program (12)-(13)  satisfies (13)with equality when e l  is 
near enough 82.Moreover, as the proof shows, (13)is violated for ( u l ,  v 2 )  such 
that vn = v*(02)= a*(&) and v*(O1)< ul  5 v*(A2)= v*(02).Hence, for A1  
near 02, any separating equilibrium ( v ( . ) ,  a ( . ) ,  g( . l . ) )  must satisfy u2(An)= 
v*(A2)and v l (B1)5 v*(O1).But for a small trader, a higher price is unambigu- 
ously better than a lower price. Thus (u*(.),  a*( . ) ,  g*(.I .)) is the small traders' 
favorite separating equilibrium, and it suffices to show that they consider this 
equilibrium inferior to the pooling equilibrium defined by (1  1).  
When 01 = € I 2 ,  the small traders are, of course, indifferent between the two 
equilibria. Thus we need demonstrate only that the derivative of the small 
traders' payoff with respect to A1  at 01 = On  is greater for the separating than 
for the pooling equilibrium. For the separating equilibrium (v*(.),  a*( . ) ,  
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g*(.1 .)), we have 
+ [ e l  + i - u * ( e i ) ~ & r ( ~ * ( ~ i ) .+ & ( u * ( ~ i ) ,0 1 )  e l ) ]  
Because ( 13 )holds with equality, 
and so 
(1  - a + [e2- el)]&^} dv* -+ [02 - v*(Ol)]6i2= 0. ( A15 )do 1 
Now v*(Os)maximizes ( A 2  - v ) [ l  - &(u,  02 ) ] .  Thus 
But at O 1  = 02, v*(O1) = v*(e2) ,and so from (A16 ) ,the coefficient of dv*/dO1 
in (A15 ) is zero. Thus from ( A15 ) ,  
From (A15 ) ,the right-hand side of ( A14 )simplifies at = 82 to 
From (A16 ) ,  < 0. Hence, in view of (.417)and because Ecu' < 0, (12 18) is m, 
and so the derivative of the small traders' payoff is infinite. 
By contrast, the derivative of the small traders' payoff at e l  = 132 in the 
pooling equilibrium is 
where uO(O1,0 2 )maximizes C, ~ ~ ( 0 ,u ) [1  -- aO(u,  01, O,)]. The first-order 
condition for this maximization is 
Implicitly differentiating ( A20 )with respect to 01 ,we obtain 
[(0,- vO)ay l- 2a?]-avo + ( A l  - v O ) a ~ *- a: 
1 
- -  
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and hence 
-TI.? -1=.[(el - uo)cx~?- a:] 
duo 	- (A21)
do 1 
o - 1 - 2.11 
I 
But (A21) is clearly finite, and thus so is (A19). Hence the derivative for the 
separating equilibrium is bigger, as required. Q.E.D 
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